We study the limitations of steganography when the sender is not using any properties of the underlying channel beyond its entropy and the ability to sample from it. On the negative side, we show that the number of samples the sender must obtain from the channel is exponential in the rate of the stegosystem. On the positive side, we present the first secret-key stegosystem that essentially matches this lower bound regardless of the entropy of the underlying channel. Furthermore, for high-entropy channels, we present the first secret-key stegosystem that matches this lower bound statelessly (i.e., without requiring synchronized state between sender and receiver).
Introduction
Steganography's goal is to conceal the presence of a secret message within an innocuous-looking communication. In other words, steganography consists of hiding a secret hiddentext message within a public covertext to obtain a stegotext in such a way that an unauthorized observer is unable to distinguish between a covertext with a hiddentext and one without.
The first rigorous complexity-theoretic formulation of secret-key steganography was provided by Hopper, Langford, and von Ahn [11] . In this formulation, steganographic secrecy of a stegosystem is defined as the inability of a polynomial-time adversary to distinguish between observed distributions of unaltered covertexts and stegotexts. (This is in contrast with many previous works, which tended to be information-theoretic in perspective; see, e.g., [4] and other references in [4, 11] .)
Model
In steganography, the very presence of a message must be hidden from the adversary, who must be given no reason for suspecting that anything is unusual. This is the main difference from encryption, which does not prevent the adversary from suspecting that a secret message is being sent, but only from decoding the message. To formalize "unusual," some notion of usual communication must exist.
We adopt the model of [11] with minor changes. In it, sender sends data to receiver. The usual (nonsteganographic) communication comes from the channel, which is a distribution of possible documents sent from sender to receiver based on past communication. The channel models the sender's decision process about what to say next in ordinary communication; thus, the sender is given access to the channel via a sampling oracle that takes the past communication as input and returns the next document from the appropriate probability distribution. Sender and receiver share a secret key (publickey steganography is addressed in [1, 18] ).
The adversary is assumed to also have some information about the usual communication, and thus about the channel. It listens to the communication and tries to distinguish the case where the sender and receiver are just carrying on the usual conversation (equivalently, sender is honestly sampling from the oracle) from the case where the sender is transmitting a hiddentext message m ∈ {0, 1} * (the message may even be chosen by the adversary). A stegosystem is secure if the adversary's suspicion is not aroused-i.e., if the two cases cannot be distinguished.
Desirable Characteristics of a Stegosystem
Black-Box In order to obtain a stegosystem of broad applicability, one would like to make as few assumptions as possible about the understanding of the underlying channel. As Hopper et al. [11] point out, the channel may be very complex and not easily described. For example, if the parties are using photographs of city scenes as covertexts, it is reasonable to assume that the sender can obtain such photographs, but unreasonable to expect the sender and the receiver to know a polynomial-time algorithm that can construct such photographs from uniformly distributed random strings. We therefore concentrate on black-box steganography, in which the knowledge about the channel is limited to the sender's ability to query the sampling oracle and a bound on the channel's min-entropy available to sender and receiver. In particular, the receiver is not assumed to be able to sample from the channel. The adversary, of course, may know more about the channel.
Efficient (in Terms of Running Time, Number of Samples, Rate, Reliability)
The running times of sender's and receiver's algorithms should be minimized. Affairs are slightly complicated by the sender's algorithm, which involves two kinds of fundamentally different operations: computation and channel sampling. Because obtaining a channel sample could conceivably be of much higher cost than performing a computation step, the two should be separately accounted for.
Transmission rate of a stegosystem is the number of hiddentext bits transmitted per single stegotext document sent. Transmission rate is tied to reliability, which is the probability of successful decoding of an encoded message (and unreliability, which is one minus reliability). The goal is to construct stegosystems that are reliable and transmit at a high rate (it is easier to transmit at a high rate if reliability is low and so the receiver will not understand much of what is transmitted).
Even if a stegosystem is black-box, its efficiency may depend on the channel distribution. We will be interested in the dependence on the channel min-entropy h. Ideally, a stegosystem would work well even for low-min-entropy channels.
Secure Insecurity is defined as the adversary's advantage in distinguishing stegotext from regular channel communication (and security as one minus insecurity). Note that security, like efficiency, may depend on the channel min-entropy. We are interested in stegosystems with insecurity as close to 0 as possible, ideally even for low-min-entropy channels.
Stateless It is desirable to construct stateless stegosystems, so that the sender and the receiver need not maintain synchronized state in order to communicate long messages. Indeed, the need for synchrony may present a particular problem in steganography in case messages between sender and receiver are dropped or arrive out of order. Unlike in counter-mode symmetric encryption, where the counter value can be sent along with the ciphertext in the clear, here this is not possible: the counter itself would also have to be steganographically encoded to avoid detection, which brings us back to the original problem of steganographically encoding multibit messages.
Our Contributions
We study the optimal efficiency achievable by black-box steganography and present secret-key stegosystems that are nearly optimal. Specifically, we demonstrate the following results:
• A lower bound, which states that a secure and reliable black-box stegosystem with rate of w bits per document sent requires the encoder to take at least c2 w samples from the channel per w bits sent, for some constant c. The value of c depends on security and reliability and tends to 1/(2e) as security and reliability approach 1. This lower bound applies to secret-key as well as public-key stegosystems. • A stateful black-box secret-key stegosystem STF that transmits w bits per document sent takes 2 w samples per w bits and has unreliability of 2 −h+w per document (recall that h is the channel entropy) and negligible insecurity, which is independent of the channel. (A very similar construction was independently discovered by Hopper [12, Construction 6.10].) • A stateless black-box secret-key stegosystem STL that transmits w bits per document sent takes 2 w samples per w bits and has unreliability 2 −Θ(2 h ) and insecurity negligibly close to l 2 2 −h+2w for lw bits sent.
Note that for both stegosystems, the rate vs. number of samples tradeoff is very close to the lower bound-in fact, for channels with sufficient entropy, the optimal rate allowed by the lower bound and the achieved rate differ by log 2 2e < 2.5 bits (and some of that seems due to slack in the bound). Thus, our bound is quite tight, and our stegosystems quite efficient. The proof of the lower bound involves a surprising application of the huge random objects of [8] , specifically of the truthful implementation of a boolean function with interval-sum queries. The lower bound demonstrates that significant improvements in stegosystem performance must come from assumptions about the channel.
The stateless stegosystem STL can be used whenever the underlying channel distribution has sufficient min-entropy h for the insecurity l 2 2 −h+2w to be acceptably low. It is extremely simple, requiring just evaluations of a pseudorandom function for encoding and decoding, and very reliable.
If the underlying channel does not have sufficient min-entropy, then the stateful stegosystem STF can be used, because its insecurity is independent of the channel. While it requires shared synchronized state between sender and receiver, the state information is only a counter of the number of documents sent so far. If min-entropy of the channel is so low that unreliability of 2 −h+w per document is too high for the application, reliability of this stegosystem can be improved through the use of error-correcting codes over the 2 w -ary alphabet (applied to the hiddentext before stegoencoding), because failure to decode correctly is independent for each w-bit block. Error-correcting codes can increase reliability to be negligibly close to 1 at the expense of reducing the asymptotic rate from w to w − (h + 2)2 −h+w . Finally, of course, the min-entropy of any channel can be improved from h to nh by viewing n consecutive samples as a single draw from the channel; if h is extremely small to begin with, this will be more efficient than using error-correcting codes (this improvement requires both parties to be synchronized modulo n, which is not a problem in the stateful case).
This stateful stegosystem STF also admits a few variants. First, the logarithmic amount of shared state can be eliminated at the expense of adding a linear amount of private state to the sender and reducing reliability slightly (as further described in 4.1), thus removing the need for synchronization between the sender and the receiver. Second, under additional assumptions about the channel (e.g., if each document includes time sent, or has a sequence number), STF can be made completely stateless. The remarks of this paragraph and the previous one can be equally applied to [12, Construction 6.10].
Related Work
The bibliography on the subject of steganography is extensive; we do not review it all here, but rather recommend references in [11] .
Constructions In addition to introducing the complexity-theoretic model for steganography, [11] proposed two constructions of black-box 1 secret-key stegosystems, called Construction 1 and Construction 2.
Construction 1 is stateful and, like our stateful construction STF, boasts negligible insecurity regardless of the channel. However, it can transmit only 1 bit per document, and its reliability is limited by 1/2 + 1/4(1 − 2 −h ) per document sent, which means that, regardless of the channel, each hiddentext bit has probability at least 1/4 of arriving incorrectly (thus, to achieve high reliability, error-correcting codes with expansion factor of at least 1/(1 − H 2 (1/4)) ≈ 5 are needed). In contrast, STF has reliability that is exponentially (in the min-entropy) close to 1, and thus works well for any channel with sufficient entropy. Furthermore, it can transmit at rate w for any w < h, provided that the encoder has sufficient time for the 2 w samples required. It can be seen as a generalization of Construction 1. Construction 2 of [11] is stateless. Like the security of our stateless construction STL, its security depends on the min-entropy of the underlying channel. While no exact analysis is provided in [11] , the insecurity of Construction 2 seems to be roughly 1 Construction 2, which, strictly speaking, is not presented as a black-box construction in [11] , can be made black-box through the use of extractors (such as universal hash functions) in place of unbiased functions, as shown in [18] . √ l2 (−h+w)/2 (due to the fact that the adversary sees l samples either from C or from a known distribution with bias roughly 2 (−h+w)/2 caused by a public extractor; see Appendix A), which is higher than the insecurity of STL (unless l and w are so high that h < 3w + 3 log l, in which case both constructions are essentially insecure, because insecurity is higher than the inverse of the encoder's running time l2 w ). Reliability of Construction 2, while not analyzed in [11] , seems close to the reliability of STL. The rate of Construction 2 is lower (if other parameters are kept the same), due to the need for randomized encryption of the hiddentext, which necessarily expands the number of bits sent.
It is important to note that the novelty of STL is not the construction itself, but rather its analysis. Specifically, its stateful variant appeared as Construction 1 in the Extended Abstract of [11] , but the analysis of the Extended Abstract was later found to be flawed by [13] . Thus, the full version of [11] included a different Construction 1. We simply revive this old construction, make it stateless, generalize it to w bits per document, and, most importantly, provide a new analysis for it.
In addition to the two constructions of [11] described above, and independently of our work, Hopper [12] proposed two more constructions: Constructions 6.10 ("Multi-Block") and 3.15 ("NoState"). As already mentioned, MultiBlock is essentially the same as our STF. NoState is an interesting variation of Construction 1 of [11] that addresses the problem of maintaining shared state at the expense of lowering the rate even further.
Bounds on the Rate and Efficiency Hopper [12, Sect. 6.2] establishes a bound on the rate vs. efficiency tradeoff. Though quantitatively similar to ours (in fact, tighter by the constant of 2e), this bound applies only to a restricted class of black-box stegosystems: essentially, stegosystems that encode and decode one block at a time and sample a fixed number of documents per block. The bound presented in this paper applies to any blackbox stegosystem, as long as it works for a certain reasonable class of channels, and thus can be seen as a generalization of the bound of [12] . Our proof techniques are quite different from those of [12] , and we hope they may be of independent interest. We refer the reader to Sect. 3.4 for an elaboration. Finally, it should be noted that non-black-box stegosystems can be much more efficient-see [11, 14, 15, 18] .
Definitions

Steganography
The definitions here are essentially those of [11] . We modify them in three ways. First, we view the channel as producing documents (symbols in some, possibly very large, alphabet) rather than bits. This simplifies notation and makes min-entropy of the channel more explicit. Second, we consider stegosystem reliability as a parameter rather than a fixed value. Third, we make the length of the adversary's description (and the adversary's dependence on the channel) explicit in the definition.
The Channel Let Σ be an alphabet; we call the elements of Σ documents. A channel C is a map that takes a history H ∈ Σ * as input and produces a probability distribution D H ∈ Σ . A history H = s 1 s 2 . . . s n is legal if each subsequent symbol is obtainable given the previous ones, i.e., Pr D s 1 s 2 ..
where the minimum is taken over legal histories H.
Our stegosystems will make use of a channel sampling oracle M, which, on input H, outputs a symbol s according to D H . A stegosystem may be designed for a particular Σ and min-entropy of C.
Definition 1.
A black-box secret-key stegosystem for the alphabet Σ is a pair of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms ST = (SE, SD) such that, for a security parameter κ, 1. SE has access to a channel sampling oracle M for a channel C on Σ and takes as input a randomly chosen key K ∈ {0, 1} κ , a string m ∈ {0, 1} * (called the hiddentext), and the channel history H. It returns a string of symbols s 1 s 2 . . . s l ∈ Σ * (called the stegotext) 2. SD takes as input a key K ∈ {0, 1} κ , a stegotext s 1 s 2 . . . s l ∈ Σ * , and a channel history H and returns a hiddentext m ∈ {0, 1} * .
We further assume that the length l of the stegotext output by SE depends only on the length of hiddentext m but not on its contents.
Stegosystem Reliability
The reliability of a stegosystem ST with security parameter κ for a channel C and messages of length μ is defined as
Unreliability is defined as UnRel ST(κ),C,μ = 1 − Rel ST(κ),C,μ .
The Adversary We consider only passive adversaries who mount a chosen hiddentext attack on ST (stronger adversarial models for steganography have also been considered, see, e.g., [1, 11, 18] ). The goal of such an adversary is to distinguish whether it is seeing encodings of the hiddentext it supplied to the encoder or simply random draws from the channel. To this end, define an oracle O(·, H) that produces random draws from the channel starting with history H as follows: on input m ∈ {0, 1} * , O computes the length l of the stegotext that SE M (K, m) would have output and outputs s 1 s 2 . . . s l where each
Definition 2. W is a (t, d, q, λ) passive adversary for stegosystem ST if 1. W runs in expected time t (including the running time needed by the stegoencoder to answer its queries) and has description of length d (in some canonical language). 2. W has access to C via the sampling oracle M(·). 3. W can make an expected number ofueries of combined length λ bits to an oracle which is either SE M (K, ·, ·) or O(·, ·). 4. W outputs a bit indicating whether it was interacting with SE or with O.
Stegosystem Security
The advantage Adv SS (here SS stands for "Steganographic Secrecy") of W against ST with security parameter κ for a channel C is defined as
For a given (t, d, q, λ) , the insecurity of a stegosystem ST with respect to channel C is defined as
and security Sec as 1 − InSec.
Note that the adversary's algorithm can depend on the channel C, subject to the restriction on the algorithm's total length d. In other words, the adversary can possess some description of the channel in addition to the black-box access provided by the channel oracle. This is a meaningful strengthening of the adversary: indeed, it seems imprudent to assume that the adversary's knowledge of the channel is limited to whatever is obtainable by black-box queries (for instance, the adversary has some idea of a reasonable email message or photograph should look like). It does not contradict our focus on black-box steganography: it is prudent for the honest parties to avoid relying on particular properties of the channel, while it is perfectly sensible for the adversary, in trying to break the stegosystem, to take advantage of whatever information about the channel is available.
Pseudorandom Functions
We use pseudorandom functions [7] as a tool. Because the adversary in our setting has access to the channel, any cryptographic tool used must be secure even given the information provided by the channel. Thus, the underlying assumption for our constructions is the existence of pseudorandom functions that are secure given the channel oracle, which is equivalent [9] to the existence of one-way functions that are secure given the channel oracle. This is the minimal assumption needed for steganography [11] .
Let F = {F seed } seed∈{0,1} * be a family of functions, all with the same domain and range. For a probabilistic adversary A, and channel C with sampling oracle M, the PRF-advantage of A over F is defined as
where g is a random function with the same domain and range. For a given (t, d, q), the insecurity of a pseudorandom function family F with respect to channel C is defined as
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries that run in expected time t, whose description size is at most d, and that make an expected number ofueries to their oracles.
The existence of pseudorandom functions is also the underlying assumption for our lower bound; however, for the lower bound, we do not need to give the adversary access to a channel oracle (because we construct the channel). To distinguish this weaker assumption, we will omit the subscript C from InSec.
The Lower Bound
Recall that we define the rate of a stegosystem as the average number of hiddentext bits per document sent (this should not be confused with the average number of hiddentext bits per bit sent; note also that this is the sender's rate, not the rate of information actually decoded by the receiver, which is lower due to unreliability). We set out to prove that a reliable stegosystem with black-box access to the channel with rate w must make roughly l2 w queries to the channel to send a message of length lw. Intuitively, this should be true because each document carries w bits of information on average, but since the encoder knows nothing about the channel, it must keep on sampling until it gets the encoding of those w bits, which amounts to 2 w samples on average.
In particular, for the purposes of this lower bound, it suffices to consider a restricted class of channels: the distribution of the sample depends only on the length of the history (not on its contents). We will write D 1 , D 2 , . . . , D i , . . ., instead of D H , where i is the length of the history H. Furthermore, it will suffice for us to consider only distributions D i that are uniform on a subset of Σ. We will use the notation D i both for the distribution and for the subset (as is often done for uniform distributions).
Let H denote the number of elements of D i (note that H = |D i | = 2 h ), and let S = |Σ|. Because the encoder knows the min-entropy h of the channel, if H = S, then the encoder knows the channel completely (it is simply uniform on Σ). Therefore, if H = S, then there is no meaningful lower bound on the number of queries made by the encoder to the channel oracle, because it does not need to make any queries in order to sample from the channel. Thus, we require that H < S (our bounds will depend slightly on the ratio of S to S − H ).
Our proof proceeds in two parts. First, we consider a stegoencoder SE that does not output anything that it did not receive as a response from the channel-sampling oracle (intuitively, every good stegoencoder should work this way, because otherwise it may output something that is not in the channel and thus be detected). To be reliable-that is, to find a set of documents that decode to the desired message-such an encoder has to make many queries, as shown in Lemma 1. Second, we formalize the intuition that a good stegoencoder should output only documents it received from the channelsampling oracle: we show that to be secure (i.e., not output something easily detectable by the adversary), a black-box SE cannot output anything it did not receive from the oracle: if it does, it has an 1 − H/S chance of being detected.
The second half of the proof is somewhat complicated by the fact that we want to assume security only against bounded adversaries: namely, ones whose description size and running time are polynomial in the description size and running time of the encoder (in particular, polynomial in log S rather than S). Thus, the adversary cannot be detecting a bad stegoencoder by simply carrying a list of all the entries in D i for each i and checking if the ith document sent by the stegoencoder is in D i , because that would make the adversary's description too long. This requires us to come up with pseudorandom subsets D i of Σ that have concise descriptions and high min-entropy and whose membership is impossible for the stegoencoder to predict. In order to do that, we utilize techniques from the truthful implementation of a boolean function with interval-sum queries of [8] (truthfulness is important, because min-entropy has to be high unconditionally).
Lower Bound When Only Query Results Are Output
If D 1 , D 2 , . . . are subsets of Σ, then we write D = D 1 × D 2 × · · · to denote the channel that, on history length i, outputs a uniformly random element of D i . If |D 1 | = |D 2 | = · · · = 2 h then we say that D is a flat h-channel. We will consider flat h-channels.
Normally, one would think of the channel sampling oracle for D as making a fresh random choice from D i when queried on history length i. However, from the point of view of the stegoencoder, it does not matter if the choice was made by the oracle in response to the query or before the query was even made. It will be easier for us to think of the oracle as having already made and written down countably many samples from each D i . We will denote the j th sample from D i by s i,j . Thus, suppose that the oracle has already chosen
We will denote the string containing all these samples by S and refer to it as a draw sequence from the channel. We will give our stegoencoder access to an oracle (also denoted by S) that, each time it is queried with i, returns the next symbol from the sequence s i,1 , s i,2 , . . . , s i,j , . . .. Choosing S at random and giving the stegoencoder access to it is equivalent to giving the encoder access to the usual channel-sampling oracle M for our channel D. Denote the stegoencoder's output by
Because we assume in this section that the stegoencoder outputs only documents it got from the channel oracle, t i is an element of the sequence s i,1 , s i,2 , . . . , s i,j , . . .. If t i is the j th element of this sequence, then it took j queries to produce it. We will denote by weight of t with respect to S the number of queries it took to produce t:
In the next lemma, we prove (by looking at the decoder) that, for any S, most messages have high weight, i.e., must take many queries to encode. Lemma 1. Let F : Σ * → {0, 1} * be an arbitrary (possibly unbounded) deterministic stegodecoder that takes a sequence t ∈ Σ l and outputs a message m of length lw bits.
Then the probability that a random lw-bit message has an encoding of weight significantly less than (1/e)l2 w is small. More precisely, for any S ∈ Σ * * and any N ∈ N:
Proof. Simple combinatorics show that the number of different sequences t that have weight at most N (and hence the number of messages that have encodings of weight at most N ) is at most N l : indeed, it is simply the number of positive integer solutions to j 1 + · · · + j l ≤ N , which is the number of ways to put l bars among N − l stars (the number of stars to the right of the ith bar corresponds to j i − 1), or, equivalently, the number of ways choose l positions out of N . The total number of messages is 2 lw . The last inequality follows from N l < ( Ne l ) l (which is a standard combinatorics fact and follows from k! ≥ (k/e) k , which in turn follows by induction on k from e > (1 + 1/k) k ).
Our lower bound applies when a stegosystem is used to encode messages drawn uniformly from bit strings of equal length. It can easily be extended to messages drawn from a uniform distribution on any set. If the messages are not drawn from a uniform distribution, then, in principle, they can be compressed before transmission, thus requiring less work on the part of the stegoencoder. We do not provide a lower bound in such a case, because any such lower bound would depend on the compressibility of the message source.
Secure Stegosystems Almost Always Output Query Answers
The next step is to prove that the encoder of a secure black-box stegosystem must output only what it gets from the oracle, or else it has a high probability of outputting something not in the channel. Assume that D is a flat h-channel chosen uniformly at random. For t = t 1 . . . t l ∈ Σ * , let t ∈ D denote that t i is in D i for each i. In the following lemma, we demonstrate that, if the encoder's output t contains a document that it did not receive as a response to a query, the chances that t ∈ D are at most H/S.
Before stating the lemma, we define the set E of all possible flat h-channels and draw sequences consistent with them: E = {( D, S) | s i,j ∈ D i }. We will be taking probabilities over E. Strictly speaking, E is an infinite set, because we defined D to be countable and S to have countably many samples from each D i . For clarity, it may be easiest to think of truncating these countable sequences to a sufficiently large value beyond which no stegoencoder will ever go, thus making E finite, and then use the uniform distribution on E. Formally, E can be defined as a product of countably many discrete probability spaces (see, e.g., [6, Sect. 9.6]), with uniform distribution on each.
Lemma 2.
Consider any deterministic procedure A that is given oracle access to a random flat h-channel D and outputs t = t 1 t 2 . . . t l ∈ Σ * (think of A as the stegoencoder running on some input key, message, channel history, and fixed randomness). Provided that h is sufficiently smaller than log S, if A outputs something it did not get from the oracle, then the probability t ∈ D is low.
More precisely, let Q i be the set of responses A received to its queries from the ith channel D i . Define the following two events:
Proof. If A were always outputting just a single value (l = 1), the proof would be trivial: seeing some samples from a random D 1 does not help A come up with another value from D 1 , and D 1 makes up only an H/S fraction of all possible outputs of A.
The proof below is a generalization of this argument for l ≥ 1, with care to avoid simply taking the union bound, which would get us lH/S instead of H/S. 
The above probability is for any fixed S of the right length and randomly chosen D consistent with S. Therefore, it also holds for randomly chosen ( D, S) ∈ E, because the order in which S and D are chosen and the values in S beyond what A queries do not affect the probability. We thus have
Lower Bound for Unbounded Adversary
We now want to tie together Lemmas 1 and 2 to come up with a lower bound on the efficiency of the stegoencoder in terms of rate, reliability, and security. Note that some work is needed, because even though Lemma 1 is about reliability and Lemma 2 is about security, neither mentions the parameters Rel and InSec. Assume, for now, that the adversary can test whether t i is in the support of D i . (This is not possible if D i is completely random and the adversary's description is small compared to S = |Σ|; however, it serves as a useful warm-up for the next section.) Then, using Lemma 2, it is easily shown that, if the stegoencoder has insecurity , then it cannot output something it did not receive as response to a query with probability higher than /(1 − H/S). This leads to the following theorem. Theorem 1. Let (SE, SD) be a black-box stegosystem with insecurity against an adversary who has an oracle for testing membership in the support of C, unreliability ρ and rate w for an alphabet Σ of size S. Then, for any positive integer H < S, there exists a channel with min-entropy h = log 2 H such that the probability that the encoder makes at most N queries to send a random message of length lw is at most
and the expected number of queries per stegotext symbol is therefore at least
Note that, like Lemma 1, this theorem and Theorem 2 apply when a stegosystem is used to encode messages drawn uniformly from the distribution of all lw-bit messages (see remark following the proof of Lemma 1).
Proof. We define the following events, which are all subsets of E ×{0, 1} * ×{0, 1} lw × {0, 1} * (below v denotes the randomness of SE):
• "SE makes few queries to encode m under K": Few = { D, S, K, m, v | SE S (K, m; v) makes at most N queries} (note that this is the event whose probability we want to bound) Suppose that SE outputs a correct encoding of a message m. In that case, the probability that it made at most N queries to the channel is upper bounded by the probability that:
(i) there exists an encoding of m of weight at most N , or (ii) SE output something it did not query. In other words, 
Now by combining (1), (2) , and the fact that Pr[Corr] ≤ ρ by reliability, we get that
Note that the probability is taken, in particular, over a random choice of D. Therefore, it holds for at least one flat h-channel.
Let random variable q be equal to the number of queries made by SE to encode m under K. Then, letting d = l2 w /e and c = 1 − ρ − 1−H/S , we get
The expected number of queries per document sent is (E[q])/ l and so is at least ( 1 2 − ρ − 1−H/S )(2 w /e).
Lower Bound for Computationally Bounded Parties
We now want to establish the same lower bound without making such a strong assumption about the security of the stegosystem. Namely, we do not want to assume that the insecurity is low unless the adversary's description size and running time are feasible ("feasible," when made rigorous, will mean some fixed polynomial in the description size and running time of the stegoencode and in a security parameter for a function that is pseudorandom against the stegoencoder). Recall that our definitions allow the adversary to depend on the channel; thus, our goal is to construct channels that have short descriptions for the adversary but look like random flat h-channels to the blackbox stegoencoder. In other words, we wish to replace a random flat h-channel with a pseudorandom one.
We note that the channel is pseudorandom only in the sense that it has a short description, so as to allow the adversary to be computationally bounded. The min-entropy guarantee, however, can not be replaced with a "pseudo-guarantee": else the encoder is being lied to, and our lower bound is no longer meaningful. Thus, a simpleminded approach, such as using a pseudorandom predicate with bias H/S applied to each symbol and history length to determine whether the symbol is in the support of the channel, will not work here: because S is constant, eventually (for some history length) the channel will have lower than guaranteed min-entropy (moreover, we do not wish to assume that S is large in order to demonstrate that this is unlikely to happen; our lower bound should work for any alphabet). Rather, we need the pseudorandom implementation of the channel to be truthful 2 in the sense of [8] , and so rely on the techniques developed therein.
The result is the following theorem, which is similar to Theorem 1, except for a small term introduced by pseudorandomness of the channel. Theorem 2. There exist polynomials p 1 , p 2 and constants c 1 , c 2 with the following property. Let ST(κ) be a black-box stegosystem with security parameter κ, description size δ, unreliability ρ, rate w, and running time τ for the alphabet Σ = {0, 1, . . . , S − 1}. Assume that there exists a pseudorandom function family F (n) with insecurity InSec PRF F (n) (t, d, q) . Then, for any positive integer H < S, there exists a channel C with min-entropy h = log 2 H such that the probability that the encoder makes at most N queries to send a random message of length lw is upper bounded by
where R = S/(S − H ) and is the insecurity the stegosystem ST on the channel C against adversaries running in time p 2 (n, log S, n) of description size n + c 2 , mak-ing just one query of length lw to SE or O (i.e., = InSec SS ST(κ),C (p 2 (n, log S, l), n + c 2 , 1, lw)).
Proof. The main challenge lies in formulating the analogue of Lemma 2 under computational restrictions. Lemma 2 and its use in Theorem 1 relied on: (i) the inability of the encoder to predict the behavior of the channel (because the channel is random) and (ii) the ability of the adversary to test if a given string is in the support of the channel (which the adversary has because it is unbounded). We need to mimic this in the computationally bounded case. We do so by constructing a channel whose support (i) appears random to a bounded encoder, but (ii) has an efficient test of membership that the adversary can perform given only a short advice. As already mentioned, we wish to replace a random channel with a pseudorandom one and give the short pseudorandom seed to the adversary, while keeping the min-entropy guarantee truthful.
The next few paragraphs will explain how this is done, using the techniques of huge random objects from [8] . A reader not familiar with [8] may find it easier to skip to the paragraph entitled "Properties of the Pseudorandom Flat-h Channels," where the results of this-i.e., the properties of the channel that we obtain-are summarized.
Specifying and Implementing the Flat-h Channel
For the next few paragraphs, familiarity with [8] will be assumed. Recall that [8] requires a specification of the object that will be pseudorandomly implemented, in the form of a Turing machine with a countably infinite random tape. It would be straightforward to specify the channel as a random object (random subset D of Σ of size H ) admitting two types of queries: "sample" and "test membership." But a pseudorandom implementation of such an object would also replace random sampling with pseudorandom sampling, whereas in a stegosystem the encoder is guaranteed a truly random sample from D (indeed, without such a guarantee, the min-entropy guarantee is no longer meaningful). Therefore, we need to construct a slightly different random object, implement it pseudorandomly, and add random sampling on top of it. We specify the random object as follows. Recall that S = |Σ|, h is the min-entropy, and H = 2 h . In what way does M = M ω specify a flat h-channel? To see that, identify Σ with {0, . . . , S − 1}, and let D i be the subset of Σ indicated by the ones in y. Then D i has cardinality H and testing membership in D i can be realized using a single query to M:
return M (S, H, i, s, s) Obviously, D i are selected uniformly at random and independently of each other. Thus, this object specifies the correct channel and allows membership testing. We now use this object to allow for random sampling of D i . Outputting a random element of D i can be realized via log S queries to M, using the following procedure (essentially, binary search):
return random-element-in-range M (S, H, i, 0, S − 1) random-element-in-range M (S, H, i, a, b) : if a = b then return a and terminate
We can implement this random object pseudorandomly using the same techniques as [8] uses for implementing random boolean functions with interval sums (see [8, Theorem 3.2] ). Namely, the authors of [8] give a construction of a truthful pseudoimplementation of a random object determined by a random boolean function f : {0, . . . , 2 n − 1} → {0, 1} that accepts queries in the form of two n-bit integers (a, b) and answers with b j =a f (j). Roughly, their construction is as follows. Let S = 2 n . Imagine a full binary tree of depth n whose leaves contain values f (0), f (1), . . . , f (S − 1). Any other node in the tree contains the sum of leaves in its subtree. Given access to such tree, we can compute any sum f (a) + f (a + 1) + · · · + f (b) in time proportional to n. Moreover, such trees need not be stored fully but can be evaluated dynamically, from the root down to the leaves, as follows. The value in the root (i.e., the sum of all leaves) has binomial distribution and can be filled in pseudorandomly. Other nodes have more complex distributions but can be also filled in pseudorandomly and consistently, so that they contain the sums of their leaves. The construction uses a pseudorandom function to come up with the value at each node.
We need to make three modifications. First, we simply fix the value in the root to H , so that f (0) + f (1) + · · · + f (S − 1) = H . Second, we allow S to be not a power of 2. Third, in order to create multiple distributions D i , we add i as an input to the pseudorandom function, thus getting different (and independent-looking) randomness for each D i .
Having made these modifications, we obtain a truthful pseudo-implementation of M. It can be used within insupp and rndelt instead of M, for efficient membership testing and truly random sampling from our pseudorandom channel.
Properties of the Pseudorandom Flat h-Channels
We thus obtain that, given a short random seed ω, it is possible to create a flat h-channel that is indistinguishable from random and allows for efficient membership testing and truly random sampling given ω. To emphasize the pseudorandomness of the channel, in our notation we will use DPR insted of D and keep the seed ω explicit as a supercript. Thus, DPR ω i is a pseudorandom subset of Σ of size H , and the channel is denoted by
Similarly to E defined in Sect. 3.2 for truly random channels, define EPR n = {(ω, S) | |ω| = n, s i,j ∈ DPR ω i }. Because − − → DPR ω has the requisite min-entropy, it is valid to expect proper performance of the stegoencoder on it; because it is pseudorandom, an analog of Lemma 2 will still hold; and because it has efficient membership testing given a short seed, the adversary will be able to see if an output of the stegoencoder is not from it.
We are now ready to formally state the claim about the properties of − − → DPR. For this claim and for the rest of the proof, we assume existence of a family of pseudorandom functions F with insecurity InSec PRF F (n) (t, d, q) (recall that InSec is a bound on the distinguishing advantage of any adversary running in time at most t of description size at most d making at mostueries). To simplify the notation, we will note that for us d always will be at most description size of the stegosystem plus some constant c 1 , and that q ≤ t. We will then write ι PRF (n, t) instead of InSec PRF F (n) (t, d, q) .
There is a polynomial p and a family of channels − − → DPR ω , indexed by a string ω of length n (as well as values H and S), such that, for any positive integers n, i and H ≤ S, channel − − → DPR has the following properties:
• is a flat h-channel for h = log H on the alphabet {0, . . . , S − 1};
• allows for sampling and membership testing in time polynomial in n, log S, and log i given ω, i, H , and S as inputs; • is pseudorandom in the following sense: for any H , S, and any oracle machine (distinguisher) A with running time τ ≥ log S,
where Memb( D) and Memb(ω) denote membership testing oracles for D and − − → DPR ω , respectively.
The claim follows from the results of [8] with minor modifications, as presented above. We present no proof here.
Note that the second argument to ι PRF depends on S only to the extent τ does; this is important, because, even for large alphabets and high-entropy channels, we want to keep the second argument to ι PRF as low a possible so that ι PRF is as low as possible.
Stegosystems Running with DPR Almost Always Output Query Answers
Having built pseudorandom channels, we now state the analog of Lemma 2 that works for stegosystems secure only against bounded adversaries. Fix some H and S. Let A be the same as in Lemma 2, but given access to − − → DPR ω instead of D, and let t = t 1 . . . t l be its output and Q i be the set of responses A received to its queries of the ith channel DPR i . Analogously to Nq and Ins, define the following two families of events, indexed by n, the security parameter for the PRF.
• nonqueried, pseudorandom version:
We show that high probability of InsPR n implies low probability of NqPR n . Formal statement of the lemma follows. To simplify the notation, let R = S/(S − H ). Lemma 3. There exists a polynomial p 1 such that, for any A running in time τ ≥ log S, if Pr[InsPR n ] < (n), then
Proof. Let Ins and Nq be the same as in Lemma 2. Let A be a machine that is given an oracle which tests membership in the channel. Let A run A to get t and output 1 if and only if the membership oracle says that t is in the channel. Applying Claim 1 to A , we have that, for some polynomial p (namely, the polynomial p(τ + t A (τ ), n), where t A is the extra time that A needs to run after A is finished),
Therefore Pr[Ins] < (n) + ι PRF (n, p(τ + p (τ, n))) + τ 2 −n . It now follows, by the same derivation as for (1) in the proof of Theorem 1, that Pr[Nq] < (n) + ι PRF (n, p (τ, n)) + τ 2 −n 1 − H/S .
Let A be a machine that runs A and outputs 1 if and only if A outputs something it did not receive as a query response. Applying Claim 1 to A , we get that, for some polynomial p (namely, the polynomial p(τ + t A (τ ), n), where t A is the extra time that A needs to run in addition to A), we get | Pr[NqPR n ] − Pr[Nq]| < ι PRF (n, p (τ, n)) + τ 2 −n . Therefore, max(p , p ) .
Completing the Proof We are now ready to prove Theorem 2. We define the same events as in the proof of Theorem 1, except as subsets of EPR n × {0, 1} * × {0, 1} lw × {0, 1} * rather than E × {0, 1} * × {0, 1} lw × {0, 1} * (we use the suffix PR to emphasize that they are for the pseudorandom channel): FewPR n , CorrPR n , LowPR n denote, respectively, that SE made at most N queries, that SD correctly decoded the hiddentext, and that the hiddentext has a low-weight encoding. Consider an adversary against our stegosystem that contains ω as part of its description, gives its oracle a random message to encode, and then tests if the output is in − − → DPR ω . It can be implemented to run in p 2 (n, log S, l) steps for some polynomial p 2 and has description size n + c 2 for some constant c 2 . Hence, its probability of detecting a stegoencoder output that is not in − − → DPR ω cannot be more than the insecurity n, log S, l) , n + c 2 , 1, lw) . In other words, Pr[InsPR n ] ≤ , and, by Lemma 3, we get
Finally, to compute a bound on the expected value, we apply the same method as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Discussion
The proof of Theorem 2 relies fundamentally on Theorem 1: specifically, Lemma 3 relies on Lemma 2. In other words, to prove a lower bound in the computationally bounded setting, we use the corresponding lower bound in the information-theoretic setting. To do so, we replace an object of an exponentially large size (the channel) with one that can be succinctly described. This replacement substitutes some informationtheoretic properties with their computational counterparts. However, for a lower bound to remain "honest" (i.e., not restricted to uninteresting channels), some global properties must remain information-theoretic. This is where the truthfulness of huge random objects of [8] comes to the rescue. We hope that other interesting impossibility results can be proved in a similar fashion by adapting an information-theoretic result using the paradigm of [8] . We think truthfulness of the objects will be important in such adaptations for the same reason it was important here.
Note that the gap in the capabilities of the adversary and encoder/decoder is different in the two settings: in the information-theoretic case, the adversary is given unrestricted computational power, while, in the computationally bounded case, it is assumed to run in polynomial time but is given the secret channel seed. However, in the informationtheoretic case, we may remove the gap altogether by providing both the adversary and the encoder/decoder with a channel membership oracle and still obtain a lower bound analogous 3 to that of Theorem 2. We see no such opportunity to remove the gap in the computationally bounded case (e.g., equipping the encoder/decoder with the channel seed seems to break our proof). Removing this asymmetry in the computationally bounded case seems challenging and worth pursuing.
The Stateful Construction STF
The construction STF relies on a pseudorandom function family F . In addition to the security parameter κ (the length of the PRF key K), it depends on the rate parameter w. Because it is stateful, both encoder and decoder take a counter ctr as input.
Our encoder is similar to the rejection-sampler-based encoder of [11] generalized to w bits: it simply samples elements from the channel until the pseudorandom function evaluated on the element produces the w-bit symbol being encoded. The crucial difference of our construction is the following: to avoid introducing bias into the channel, if the same element is sampled twice, the encoder simply flips a random coin to decide whether to output that element with probability 2 −w . Hopper [12, Construction 6.10] independently proposes a similar construction, except instead of flipping a fresh random coin, the encoder evaluates the pseudorandom function on a new counter value (there is a separate counter associated to each sampled document, indicating how many times the document has been sampled), thus conserving randomness.
Observe that, assuming F is truly random rather than pseudorandom, each sample from the channel has probability 2 −w of being output, independent of anything else, because each time fresh randomness is being used. Of course, this introduces unreliability, which is related to the probability of drawing the same element from D H twice.
Procedure STF.SE (K, w, m, H, ctr) : (2 w , O(1), 2 w ) ).
Proof. Insecurity bound is apparent from the fact that if F were truly random, then the system would be perfectly secure, because its output is distributed identically to C (simply because the encoder samples from the channel and independently at random decides which sample to output, because the random function is never applied more than once to the same input). Hence, any adversary for the stegosystem would distinguish F from random. The reliability bound per symbol can be demonstrated as follows. Assuming that F is random, the probability that f becomes 1 after j iterations of the inner loop in STF.SE (i.e., that s i = s i,j ) is (1 − 2 −w ) j −1 2 −w . If that happens, the probability that ∃j < j such that s i,j = s i,j is at most (j − 1)2 −h . Summing up and using standard formulas for geometric series, we get
Note that errors are independent for each symbol, and hence error-correcting codes over alphabet of size 2 w can be used to increase reliability: one simply encodes m before feeding it to SE. Observe that, for a truly random F , if an error occurs in position i, the symbol decoded is uniformly distributed among all elements of {0, 1} w − {m i }. Therefore, the stegosystem creates a 2 w -ary symmetric channel with error probability 2 w−h (1 − 2 −w ) = 2 −h (2 w − 1) (this comes from more careful summation in the above proof). Its capacity is [16, p. 58] . This is equal to w 1) ). Assuming that the error probability 2 −h (2 w − 1) ≤ 1/2 and using log(1 − x) ≥ −2x for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1/2, we get that the capacity of the channel created by the encoder is at least w + 2 −h (2 w − 1)(−h − 2) ≥ w − (h + 2)2 −h+w . Thus, as l grows, we can achieve rates close to w − (h + 2)2 −h+w with near perfect security and reliability (independent of h).
Stateless Variants of STF
Our stegosystem STF is stateful because we need F to take ctr as input to make sure we never apply the pseudorandom function more than once to the same input. This will happen automatically, without the need for ctr, if the channel C has the following property: for any histories H and H such that H is the prefix of H , the supports of D H and D H do not intersect. For instance, when documents have monotonically increasing sequence numbers or timestamps, no shared state is needed.
To remove the need for shared state for all channels, we can do the following. We remove ctr as an input to F and instead provide STF.SE with the set Q of all values received so far as answers from M. We replace the line "if ∃j < j s.t. s i,j = s i,j " with "if s i,j ∈ Q" and add the line "Q ← Q ∪ {s i,j }" before the end of the inner loop. Now shared state is no longer needed for security, because we again get fresh coins on each draw from the channel, even if it collides with a draw made for a previous hiddentext symbol. However, reliability suffers, because the larger l is, the more likely a collision will happen. A careful analysis, omitted here, shows that unreliability is l 2 2 −h+w (plus the insecurity of the PRF).
Unfortunately, this variant requires the encoder to store the set Q of all the symbols ever sampled from C. Thus, while it removes shared state, it requires a lot of private state. This storage can be reduced somewhat by use of Bloom filters [2] at the expense of introducing potential false collisions and thus further decreasing reliability. An analysis utilizing the bounds of [3] (omitted here) shows that using a Bloom filter with (h − w − log l)/ ln 2 bits per entry will increase unreliability by only a factor of 2, while potentially reducing storage significantly (because the symbols of Σ require at least h bits to store and possibly more if the D H is sparse).
The Stateless Construction STL
The stateless construction STL is simply STF without the counter and collision detection (and is a generalization to rate w of the construction that appeared in the extended abstract of [11] ). Again, we emphasize that the novelty is not in the construction but in the analysis. The construction requires a reliability parameter k to make sure that expected running time of the encoder does not become infinite due a low-probability event of infinite running time.
Procedure STL.SE (K, w, k, m, H) :
Theorem 4. The stegosystem STL has insecurity
More precisely,
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4 consists of a hybrid argument. The first step in the hybrid argument is to replace the stegoencoder SE with SE 1 , which is the same as SE, except that it uses a truly random G instead of pseudorandom F , which accounts for the term InSec PRF F (κ) (t + O(1), d + O(1), l2 w ). Then, rather than consider directly the statistical difference between C and the output of SE 1 on an lw-bit message, we bound it via a series of steps involving related stegoencoders (these are not encoders in the sense defined in Sect. 2, as they do not have corresponding decoders; they are simply related procedures that help in the proof).
The encoders SE 2 , SE 3 , and SE 4 are specified in Fig. 1 . SE 2 is the same as SE 1 , except that it maintains a set Q of all answers received from M so far. After receiving an answer s i,j ← M(H), it checks if s i,j ∈ Q; if so, it aborts and outputs "Fail"; else, it adds s i,j to Q. It also aborts and outputs "Fail" if j ever reaches k during an execution of the inner loop. SE 3 is the same as SE 2 , except that instead of thinking of random function G as being fixed before hand, it creates G "on the fly" by repeatedly flipping coins to decide the w-bit value assigned to s i,j . Since, like SE 2 , it aborts whenever a collision between strings of covertexts occurs, the function will remain consistent. Finally, SE 4 is the same as SE 3 , except that it never aborts with failure.
In a sequence of lemmas, we bound the statistical difference between the outputs of SE 1 and SE 2 ; show that it is the same as the statistical difference between the outputs of SE 3 and SE 4 ; and show that the outputs of SE 2 and SE 3 are distributed identically. Finally, observe that SE 4 does nothing more than sample from the channel and then randomly and obliviously to the sample keep or discard it. Hence, its output is distributed identically to the channel. The details of the proof follow.
For ease of notation, we will denote 2 −h (the upper bound on the probability of elements of D H ) by p and 2 w by R for the rest of this proof.
The following proposition serves as a warm-up for the proof of Lemma 4, which follows it. Proposition 1. The statistical difference between the output distributions of SE 1 and SE 2 for a w-bit hiddentext message m ∈ {0, 1} w is at most 2p/(R − 1) 2 
Proof. Consider the probability that SE 2 outputs "Fail" while trying to encode some m ∈ {0, 1} w . This happens for one of two reasons. First, if after k attempts to find s i,j such that G(s i,j ) = m i , no such s i,j has been drawn. Second, if the same value is returned twice by M before SE 2 finds a satisfactory s i,j ; in other words, if there has been a collision between two unsuccessful covertext documents.
Let E 1 denote the event that one of these two situations has occurred and n 1 denote the value of j at which E 1 occurs. Then
Observe that the probability that SE 2 outputs a specific document s which is not "Fail" can be only less than the probability that SE 1 outputs the same element. Since the total decrease over all such s is at most the probability of failure from above, the total statistical difference is at most 2 Pr[E 1 ].
Lemma 4.
The statistical difference between the output of SE 1 and SE 2 when encoding a message m ∈ {0, 1} lw is at most
Proof. Proposition 1 deals with the case l = 1. It remains to extend this line of analysis to the general case l > 1. As in the proof of Proposition 1, let E i denote the event that SE 2 outputs "Fail" while attempting to encode the ith block of m i . Note that E i grows with i because the set Q grows as more and more blocks are encoded. Also, let n i denote the number of attempts used by SE 2 to encode the ith block. To simplify the analysis, we initially ignore the boundary case of failure on attempt n i = k and treat a failure on this attempt like all others. Let E i denote these events. Then, we have the following sequence of probabilities. Recall that, for E 1 ,
In the harder case of E 2 ,
Pr[E 2 |n 1 draws for bit 1] Pr[n 1 draws for bit 1]
Similarly, for E 3 ,
In general, for E i , we have the recurrence
which when solved yields
Pr[E i ] < p(iR − 1)(R − 1). Now summing up the probability of failure for each of the w-bit blocks of hiddentext gives
Next, we compute the probability of the event that the encoding of block m i fails because there were k unsuccessful attempts to find a string of n covertexts which evaluates to m i under G, given that no collisions occurred so far. Call this eventÊ i . Then
and, in general,
So, the sum of the probabilities ofÊ i for i from 1 to l is just l Pr[Ê 1 ] = l( R−1 R ) k . Finally, we compute the total probability of failure which is at most the sum of the E i andÊ i events. That is, the probability that SE 2 outputs "Fail" while encoding any of the l w-bit blocks of m i of m is at most
The statistical difference is at most just twice this amount.
Lemma 5. The statistical difference between the output distributions of SE 2 and SE 3 for a random function G and hiddentext message m ∈ {0, 1} lw is zero.
Proof. Both SE 2 and SE 3 abort and output "Fail" whenever the encoding a block m i fails. This occurs because either: (1) there are k unsuccessful attempts to find s i,j such that G(s i,j ) = m i ; or (2) the same document is drawn twice, i.e., there is a collision between candidate covertext documents. Hence, SE 2 evaluates G at most once on each element of Σ. So, although SE 3 ignores G and creates its own random function by flipping coins at each evaluation, since no element of Σ will be re-assigned a new value, the output distributions of SE 2 and SE 3 are identical. Lemma 6. The statistical difference between the output distributions of SE 3 and SE 4 is equal to the statistical difference between the output distributions of SE 1 and SE 2 used to encode the same message.
Proof. As Lemma 4 shows, the probability that SE 2 (and consequently SE 3 by Lemma 5) outputs "Fail" is at most
Note that SE 4 has no such element; the probabilities of each output other that "Fail" can only increase. Hence, the total statistical difference is twice the probability of "Fail."
These three lemmas, put together, conclude the proof of the theorem. We can save a factor of two in the statistical difference by the following observation. Half of the statistical difference between the outputs of SE 1 and SE 2 , as well as between the outputs of SE 3 and SE 4 , is due to the probability of "Fail." Because neither SE 1 nor SE 4 output "Fail," the statistical difference between the distributions they produce is therefore only half of the sum of the statistical differences. where t and d are the expected running time and description size, respectively, of the stegoencoder and the stegodecoder combined.
Proof. As usual, we consider unreliability if the encoder is using a truly random G; then, for a pseudorandom F , the encoder and decoder will act as a distinguisher for F (because whether something was encoded correctly can be easily tested by the decoder), which accounts for the InSec PRF term. The stegoencoder fails to encode properly when it cannot find s i,j such that G(s i,j ) = m i after k attempts. We will consider separately the case where G is simply unlikely to hit m i and where G is reasonably likely to hit m i , but the samples from the channel are just unlucky for k times in a row.
To bound the probability of failure in the first case, fix some channel history H and w-bit message m and consider the probability over G that G(D H ) is so skewed that the weight of G −1 (m) in D H is less c2 −w for some constant c < 1 (note that the expected weight is 2 −w ). Formally, consider Pr G [Pr s←D H [G(s) = m] < c2 −w ]. Let Σ = {s 1 . . . s n } be the alphabet, and let Pr D H [s i ] = p i . Define the random variable X i as X i = 0 if G(s i ) = m and X i = p i otherwise. Then the weight of G −1 (m) equals Pr s←D H [G(s) = m] = 1 − n i=1 X i . Note that the expected value, over G, of n i=1 X i is 1 − 2 −w . Using Hoeffding's inequality (Theorem 2 of [10]), we obtain
where the second to last step follows from p i ≤ 2 −h and the last step follows from n i=1 p i = 1. If we now set c = 1/2 and take the union bound over all messages m ∈ {0, 1} w , we get that the probability that G is skewed for at least one message is at most 2 w exp[−2 h−2w−1 ].
To bound the probability of failure in the second case, assume that G(D H ) is not so skewed. Then the probability of failure is
The result follows from setting c = 1/2 and taking the union bound over l.
For a universal hash function f that maps a distribution of min-entropy h to {0, 1} w , the bias is roughly ε = 2 (−h+w)/2 . As shown in [17] , if l < 1/ε (which is reasonable to assume here), statistical difference between D l and E l is roughly at least √ lε. Hence, the approach based on public hash functions results in statistical insecurity of about √ l2 (−h+w)/2 .
